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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark Dickens Forsythe appeals from judgment of the district court entered upon the jury
verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia
and being a persistent violator. On appeal, Forsythe, “[m]indful of the district court’s alternative
holding,” argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A little before 2:00 a.m., Officer Feldner and Officer Sontag saw Forsythe riding a
bicycle in the wrong lane of traffic. (9/15/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L. 10, p. 7, Ls. 1-11.)
Forsythe was also holding a flashlight in one hand. (Id.) Officer Feldner activated his overhead
lights and Forsythe “immediately turned off the street, pulled into a driveway, and stopped his
bike behind a pickup truck, and started emptying things out of his pockets.” (9/15/16 Tr., p. 6,
Ls. 11-25.) When the officers made contact with Forsythe, they told him to keep his hands out of
his pockets, but Forsythe kept putting his hands in his pockets. (9/15/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 9, L.
16.) Officer Sontag detained Forsythe and put him in handcuffs. (Id.) When the officers looked
at the ground they saw two needles Forsythe had thrown on the ground and two cigarettes boxes.
(Id.) Inside one of the cigarette boxes the officers found a baggie of a white substance that tested
presumptive positive for methamphetamine. (Id.) The state lab test confirmed that the substance
was methamphetamine. (9/15/16 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-23; Ex. 1.)
The state charged Forsythe with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia and a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 55-56, 67-69) Forsythe moved to
suppress on the grounds that holding a flashlight while riding a bicycle at night complied with
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Idaho law and, thus, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. (R., pp. 98-101, 124160.) The state responded and argued that the motion to suppress failed to comply with Idaho
Court Rules. (R., pp. 177-190.) The state also argued that Forsythe did not have standing to
bring the motion to suppress because he did not have a reasonable or legitimate expectation of
privacy because, as a parolee, Forsythe had waived his constitutional rights related to the Fourth
Amendment.

(Id.)

In addition, the state argued Forsythe lacked standing because he had

voluntarily abandoned the evidence he sought to suppress. (Id.) Further, the state argued that the
officers had reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop because Forsythe was carrying a
flashlight in one hand and riding on the wrong side of the street. (Id.)
At the suppression hearing, the district court took judicial notice of the preliminary
hearing transcript as the factual basis for the motion to suppress. (3/1/17 Tr., p. 59, L. 12 – p. 60,
L. 6.) The district court denied Forsythe’s motion on several grounds. (3/1/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 21 –
p. 63, L. 19.) The district court determined that Idaho Code § 49-723 requires a bicyclist have
the light “attached” to the bicycle and that carrying a flashlight in one hand does not comply with
the statute. (Id.) The district court also found that Forsythe did not have standing to contest the
search of the items of evidence he sought to suppress, because he had abandoned the items by
throwing them on the ground. (Id.) Further, there was reasonable articulable suspicion for the
stop because Forsythe was riding his bicycle in the wrong lane. (Id.)
Forsythe moved the district court to reconsider. (R., pp. 206-210.) The district court
denied the motion for reconsideration. (R., pp. 215-219.) The case proceeded to jury trial. (R.,
pp. 258-268.)

The jury found Forsythe guilty of possession of methamphetamine and of

possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p. 269; 7/18/17 Tr., p. 443, L. 15 – p. 445, L. 14.)
Forsythe admitted to having at least two prior felony convictions and admitted to the persistent
2

violator enhancement. (7/18/17 Tr. p. 446, L. 8 – p. 449, L. 14.) The district court entered
judgment and sentenced Forsythe to fifteen years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 325-328.)
Forsythe timely appealed. (R., pp. 330-333.)
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ISSUE
Forsythe states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Forsythe’s motion to suppress and motion
to reconsider the denial of his motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Forsythe failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Forsythe’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Forsythe’s motion to suppress because Forsythe had abandoned

the items that were searched. (3/1/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 21 – p. 63, L. 19.) The district court also
found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain him both because his light
was not “attached” to his bicycle and because he was riding his bicycle in the wrong lane. (See
id.)
On appeal, Forsythe only challenges the district court’s holding that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to detain him because Forsythe’s flashlight was not attached to his bicycle.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.) Forsythe is “mindful” of the court’s alternative basis for
upholding the stop, but does not challenge it on appeal. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 1 (“Mindful of
the district court’s alternate holding[.]”) Forsythe also does not challenge the district court’s
determination that he abandoned the items when he threw them on the ground. (See Appellant’s
brief, pp. 5-9.) Because Forsythe has not challenged these holdings, this Court should affirm on
that basis alone.

Regardless, Forsythe has failed to show the district court erred when it

determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Forsythe because he failed to attach
a light to his bicycle.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
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principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Forsythe’s Motion To Suppress Because
He Abandoned The Items And The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Him
The officers found two syringes and a box of cigarettes containing a baggie of

methamphetamine on the ground. (9/15/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 9, L. 16.) Forsythe moved to
suppress the two syringes and baggie of methamphetamine. (See R., pp. 98-101, 124-160, 206210.) The district court denied the motion to suppress because Forsythe had abandoned the items
and thus did not have standing to contest the search and seizure of the items. (3/1/17 Tr., p. 61,
L. 21 – p. 63, L. 19; see also R., pp. 215-219.) The district court also found the officers had
reasonable suspicion to detain Forsythe. (Id.)
THE COURT: All right. I have reviewed the file and the memos and in particular
the case of State v. Clark, an unreported Idaho Court of Appeals decision, which
as it relates to the defendant’s argument, Idaho Code Section 49-719 provides that
no person operating a bicycle shall carry any package, bundle or article which
prevents the operator from using at least one hand in the control and operation of
the bicycle.
The facts in that case were substantially the same as this case. A person
was carrying a flashlight. They went on to say that had the legislature intended
carrying a light source to be sufficient under 49-723, it could have stated as much.
Instead it utilized the word “attached”, to which we must give effect. Because the
role of the court is to interpret law when it’s ambiguous, but to follow the law
when it’s not ambiguous. And in that case they reviewed the definition of
“attached” and determined that holding a flashlight did not qualify as attached as a
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determination in that case upholding another Fourth District judge in which the
issue was raised.
Ultimately the defendant does not have standing because when he was
approached by the police, he was discarding items out of his pockets onto the
ground. He was not searched and those items found incident to a search. The
items had been abandoned. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
items that he had thrown on the ground and, therefore, his motion fails for that
reason.
His motion also fails because the officers did have an articulable
reasonable suspicion to stop because he was driving in the wrong lane or riding
his bike in the wrong lane, riding against traffic rather than with traffic as required
by the law, and carrying a flashlight rather than having a light attached to his
bicycle. That was sufficiently articulable reasonable suspicion to stop.
Again, the items seized were not seized incident to a search, but they were
just picked up off the ground after the defendant abandoned those. And then
ultimately, I think, the defendant’s motion was insufficient on its own and is -could easily be denied on that basis alone.
But assuming that’s not sufficient grounds, it fails to meet the standards
required by law as to both standing issue and the reasonable suspicion issue and
the abandoned property issue.
So, Mr. Forsythe, I’m going to deny your Motion to Suppress for those
reasons.
(3/1/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 21 – p. 63, L. 19; see also R., pp. 215-219.)
On appeal, Forsythe does not challenge the district court’s determination that he
abandoned the syringes and the cigarette box containing the baggie of methamphetamine. (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.) Nor does he challenge the district court’s conclusion that the officers
had reasonable suspicion to stop Forsythe because he was riding his bicycle in the wrong lane of
traffic, and in violation of a city ordinance. (Compare 3/1/17 Tr., p. 62, L. 25 – p. 63, L. 7 and
R., p. 217 with Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9 (Forsythe is “[m]indful of the district court’s alternative
holding...”).) Because Forsythe has not challenged two of the three alternative bases on which
the district court denied Forsythe’s motion to suppress, this Court must affirm on the
7

unchallenged bases. E.g. State v. Godwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct. App.
1998) (where a basis for a trial court’s ruling is not challenged on appeal, appellate court will
affirm on unchallenged basis).
Forsythe does challenge the district court’s determination that officers had reasonable
suspicion to detain Forsythe because he did not have a light attached to his bicycle or himself.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-9.) Even if this Court addresses the merits of Forsythe’s argument, it
fails. “A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v.
Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009)).
However, limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are
permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,
203 P.3d at 1210. “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if
there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.”
Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).
Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,
203 P.3d at 1210; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
Here the district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Forsythe
because, in addition to riding in the wrong lane of traffic, he was riding a bicycle at night and had
8

no light attached to either his bicycle or himself. (See 3/1/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 21 – p. 63, L. 19.)
Idaho Code § 49-723 requires a “light emitting device” be “attached to the bicycle or the rider.”
I.C. § 49-723.
§ 49-723. Light and reflector required at night.
Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 49-903, Idaho Code, shall be
operated with a light emitting device visible from a distance of at least five
hundred (500) feet to the front, attached to the bicycle or the rider, and with a
reflector clearly visible from the rear of the bicycle.
I.C. § 49-723; see also Boise City Code § 10-14-03(C). Here the only light emitting device was a
flashlight Forsythe was holding in one hand. (See 9/15/16 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L. 10.) On
appeal, Forsythe claims that holding something in one’s hand means it is “attached.” (See
Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.) He argues: “By holding his flashlight in his hand, Mr. Forsythe took
a firm grip of it, and held it together—in other words, he attached it to himself.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 7-8.) Forsythe’s argument fails because the plain meaning of “attached” in Idaho Code
§ 49-723 does not include holding something in your hand.
The appellate court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.
State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 614, 97 P.3d 479, 481 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Schumacher,
131 Idaho 484, 485, 959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). Where the language of a statute is plain
and unambiguous, the appellate court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging
in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v.
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); Patterson, 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at
481.

The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.

Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219; Patterson, 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. If the
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative
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history or rules of statutory interpretation. Patterson, 140 Idaho at 614, 97 P.3d at 481. When
the court engages in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and
give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688; Patterson, 140 Idaho at 614,
97 P.3d at 481. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the
statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and
its legislative history. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688; Patterson, 140 Idaho at 614, 97
P.3d at 481.
The language of Idaho Code § 49-723 is clear and unambiguous. The statute requires that
a “light emitting device” be “attached to the bicycle or the rider.” I.C. § 49-723. In common
parlance, the word “attached” implies a more permanent connection than merely holding
something in your hand. For example, if a person is eating dinner and holding a fork, no one
would say that the fork is “attached” to the person.
Further, “attached” is defined as “permanently fixed.”

See Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 140 (1993). It is also defined as “joined; connected; bound.” See
Dictionary.Com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/attached (visited September 12, 2018).
Thus, under the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 49-723 the flashlight needed to have a more
permanent connection to Forsythe than merely being held in his hand. Forsythe’s argument that
holding something means it is “attached” to that person is contrary both to the dictionary
definition of the word “attached” and to its common usage. The district court did not err when it
determined that not having a flashlight attached to the bicycle or the rider provided the officers
with reasonable articulable suspicion that Forsythe was riding the bicycle contrary to the law.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 4th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of October, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
TST/dd
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